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Abstract
Various theories have been shown to account for the eVects of procedural fairness on people’s attitudes and behaviors. We pro-
pose that a logical next step for organizational justice researchers is to delineate not whether, but rather when certain explanations
are likely to account for people’s reactions to procedural fairness information. Accordingly, the present research tested the hypothe-
sis that social psychological explanations would be particularly applicable to people high in interdependent self-construal. As pre-
dicted, the results of three studies showed that interdependent self-construal (ISC) moderated the relationship between procedural
fairness and a variety of dependent variables (cooperation, positive aVect, and desire for future interaction with the other party). In
diVerent types of interpersonal encounters (social dilemmas, reward allocations, and negotiations), procedural fairness had more of
an inXuence on participants’ reactions among those high rather than low in ISC. Theoretical implications are discussed.
  2004 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.Introduction
Perceptions of fairness play an important role within
work dyads and work teams, and as a consequence have
received considerable attention from organizational and
management scholars (Folger & Cropanzano, 1998;
Greenberg & Cropanzano, 2001). Since the pioneering
work of Thibaut and Walker (1975), it has been shown
consistently that justice judgments are a function of not
only how people perceive the distribution of outcomes
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doi:10.1016/j.obhdp.2004.11.001(i.e., distributive fairness) but also of how they perceive
the procedures underlying the distribution of outcomes
(i.e., procedural fairness; Brockner & Wiesenfeld, 1996;
Folger, 1986; Lind & Tyler, 1988). Moreover, many stud-
ies have demonstrated that procedural fairness inXuences
a variety of important work attitudes and behaviors, such
as support and evaluations of authorities (Van den Bos,
Wilke, & Lind, 1998), compliance with authorities (Lind
& Tyler, 1988), organizational commitment (McFarlin &
Sweeney, 1992), organizational citizenship behavior
(Moorman, 1991), and employee theft (Greenberg, 1990).
In addition to showing pervasive eVects of proce-
dural fairness on employees’ attitudes and behaviors,
researchers have oVered a variety of explanations of
these fair process eVects. Initial theorizing accounted
for people’s desire for fair procedures from an instru-
mental perspective (Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Accord-
ing to this viewpoint, fair procedures are preferred
because they are expected to lead to more favorable
tangible outcomes.
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ber of social psychological models have been oVered that
focus on people’s interactions and relationships with one
another. Whereas the various social psychological expla-
nations diVer, one theme common to all of them is that
people may be aVected by procedural fairness informa-
tion for reasons other than their implications for peo-
ple’s economic well-being (Folger, 1998). One such social
psychological explanation is provided by the group-
value model (Lind & Tyler, 1988). According to this
framework, people care about procedural fairness
because it communicates information relevant to their
sense of self and identity in their relationships with oth-
ers. This model posits that the positive eVects of voice
arise because giving people the opportunity to express
their opinion indicates that they are respected and val-
ued by the party enacting the procedure. Such informa-
tion, in turn, enhances people’s sense of esteem and
identity (e.g. Koper, van Knippenberg, Bouhuijs, Ver-
munt, & Wilke, 1993).
Another social psychological viewpoint that has
recently gained inXuence is the notion that fairness is a
basic human value that people want to see aYrmed in
social encounters (Folger, 1998, 2001). This model sug-
gests that people are concerned with procedural fairness
not simply as a means towards better economic out-
comes, nor as a means towards understanding their rela-
tionship with others and its resulting eVects on one’s
sense of self and identity, but also as an end in its own
right. Thus, because people hold ethical values (e.g., fair-
ness) to be near and dear, they are very attentive to the
issue of whether ethical values have been aYrmed in the
course of people’s encounters with one another. This
explanation can not only account for the fact that people
directly involved in an exchange will be inXuenced by
their perceptions of procedural fairness, but also that the
attitudes and behaviors of people in the role of third
party observers may be inXuenced by their procedural
fairness perceptions (Folger, 2001; Lind, Kray, &
Thompson, 1998).
To date, theory and research have lent support to
these and other explanations (e.g., Van den Bos & Lind,
2002) of fair process eVects (for a recent overview of
explanations, see Van den Bos, in press). Therefore, it is
clear that both the instrumental and the social psycho-
logical models help to explain people’s reactions to
their perceptions of procedural fairness. Accordingly,
an important next step in the development of justice
theory is to delineate the conditions under which cer-
tain explanations are likely to be especially inXuential.
Put diVerently, rather than trying to determine which
theory is “right” and which one is “wrong,” justice
researchers are likely to be better served by delineating
when certain explanations are apt to be useful in
accounting for people’s reactions to procedural fair-
ness information.One way to do so is by examining the reactions of
people who vary in the degree of importance that they
assign to the factors central to a particular explanation.
For example, the instrumental viewpoint should be par-
ticularly applicable to people who are highly concerned
with material outcomes. The social psychological models
should be particularly applicable to those who assign
importance to their relationships with others for pur-
poses of self-esteem and/or self-identity, as well as to
those who strongly believe that ethical or moral values
should be aYrmed in social encounters. The present
research focuses attention on the social psychological
explanations by examining the inXuence of the disposi-
tional variable known as interdependent self-construal
on procedural fairness eVects.
Why focus on the moderating role of dispositional factors?
Previous studies have shown that procedural fairness
eVects are particularly prominent under circumstances in
which people attach greater psychological signiWcance to
their relationship with the other party (e.g., Tyler &
Degoey, 1995). More precisely, the more that people
identiWed with the other party the more likely they were
to be inXuenced by the other party’s level of procedural
fairness. It is worth noting, however, that the moderating
inXuence tested for in previous research predominantly
consisted of contextual or situational factors. In contrast,
the present series of studies explores the moderating
inXuence of a theoretically derived dispositional variable.
The social psychological explanations imply that the
inXuence of procedural fairness on people’s attitudes
and behaviors should be more pronounced among those
individuals who: (1) assign greater importance to their
relationships with others for self-related reasons, and/or
(2) more strongly believe that social interactions and
relationships should aYrm basic moral values. More-
over, these two factors may be related to one another.
That is, those who assign importance to their relation-
ships with others are in a potentially vulnerable position,
in that they risk being exploited by the very parties
towards whom they feel psychologically interdependent.
This risk may be minimized to the extent that the other
parties show that they can be trusted to act in ways that
aYrm basic moral values. One way in which to aYrm
basic moral values, in turn, is by being procedurally fair
(Chen, Chen, & Xin, 2004). Accordingly, for social psy-
chological (rather than instrumental) reasons, ISC was
expected to have an inXuence on the magnitude of pro-
cedural fairness eVects. More speciWcally, the present
studies tested the hypothesis that procedural fairness
eVects will be more strongly pronounced among those
high rather than low in ISC.
The concept of ISC originally gained prominence in
cross-cultural theory and research (Markus & Kitay-
ama, 1991). People high in ISC see themselves as more
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relative to their counterparts who are low in ISC. One
possible correlate of seeing oneself as closely connected
to others is the belief that relationships with others
should be respectful and aYrm moral values. Although
ISC is more predominant in collectivistic than individu-
alistic cultures, more recent research has shown mean-
ingful variation in people’s collectivism-related beliefs
(e.g., ISC) even within cultures (Chen, Brockner, & Chen,
2002; Vandello & Cohen, 1999). In other words, whereas
culture is a broad and general concept that focuses on
whether the norms society lives by are more versus less
collectivistic (e.g., Hofstede, 1980), ISC reXects an indi-
vidual-level construct referring to how much people
deWne and evaluate themselves based on their relation-
ships with signiWcant others.
It is also worth noting that ISC is merely one
dimension residing within the broader family of col-
lectivism-related beliefs. In their exhaustive review of
the individualism-collectivism literature, Oyserman,
Coon, and Kemmelmeier (2002) identiWed eight diVer-
ent ways in which collectivism has been conceptual-
ized.2 We chose to examine ISC because the essence of
the construct pertains to factors central to several
established social psychological explanations of pro-
cedural fairness eVects (e.g., Folger, 1998; Lind &
Tyler, 1988).
Study 1
In Study 1 we examined the moderating inXuence of
ISC on the element of procedural fairness that has
received the most attention in the justice literature:
voice. Voice refers to the opportunity people have to
provide input into decision-making processes. Many
studies have demonstrated that the extent to which peo-
ple are allowed voice is a key determinant of procedural
fairness (Lind & Tyler, 1988; Thibaut & Walker, 1975).
Therefore, we will operationalize procedural fairness in
Study 1 (and Study 2 to follow) by manipulating voice
versus no-voice conditions. Individual diVerences in
self-construal are assessed as an additional independent
variable.
The dependent variable in Study 1 consisted of contri-
bution behavior in the context of a social dilemma.
Social dilemmas are deWned as situations in which per-
sonal and collective interests are at odds with one
another (Komorita & Parks, 1994). Kramer (1991) has
noted that social dilemmas occur frequently in work
2 ISC is similar to the dimension that Oyserman et al. (2002) refer to
as “Related,” which they describe as the extent to which people consid-
er close others an integral part of the self. Interested readers should
refer to Oyserman et al. for a description of the other seven collectiv-
ism-related beliefs and hence, how they diVer from ISC.organizations (see also De Cremer & Van Knippenberg,
2002). In social dilemma situations, people are highly
interdependent on one another as their decisions inXu-
ence both their own and others’ outcomes.
A public goods dilemma was utilized in Study 1. Par-
ticipants were asked to contribute towards a public good
or service, which became available once a certain
amount of money or points was invested. The dominant
option in this type of social dilemma is to contribute as
little as possible to the collective welfare because once
the public good is provided no one can be excluded from
using it. However, if all people behave this way then their
collective outcomes will be worse than if all of them
decided to contribute (Dawes, 1980). An interaction
eVect between voice and ISC was predicted. More spe-
ciWcally, the tendency for voice to be positively related to
contribution behavior was expected to be more pro-
nounced among those high rather than low in ISC.
Method
Participants
Seventy-nine students (42 men and 37 women) at
Maastricht University in The Netherlands participated
voluntarily and received course credit for doing so.
Experimental procedure
Participants were told that the study was an investiga-
tion about how organizational groups make decisions.
Upon arrival at the room in which the study was con-
ducted, participants were assigned into groups of Wve or
six people. They were explicitly told not to communicate
with one another. The groups were divided in such a way
that it was salient to all participants that they were part
of an actual group. Participants were seated at individual
desks on which answer booklets were placed, and the
anonymity and conWdentiality of responses were empha-
sized. In the Wrst part of the study, participants were
asked to complete Singelis’ (1994) 12-item measure of
ISC. Sample items included, “I often have the feeling
that my relationships with others are more important
then my own accomplishments,” and “I will sacriWce my
self-interest for the beneWt of the group I am in.”
Responses could range from “strongly disagree” (1) to
“strongly agree” (7). Participants’ responses were aver-
aged into an index. Cronbach’s  was .72, similar to the
level observed in previous research (Oyserman et al.,
2002; Singelis, 1994). As expected (given random assign-
ment to the voice and no voice conditions), participants
in the two conditions did not diVer in their mean level of
ISC, t (74) D .82, ns. Subsequently, participants were
informed that their group resembled an organizational
board consisting of six persons. They were then told that
the task of this board was to make important deci-
sions for the welfare of the organization (e.g., hiring peo-
ple, regulating conXicts within the organization, etc.).
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supervise and monitor several tasks and therefore one of
them would be appointed to be the board leader. All
information was communicated in a booklet given to
participants at the beginning of the experiment. The
appointment of the leader was made clear by a message
that said that one of the group member’s booklets
included an extra page in which his or her task as board
leader was explained. (In reality, however, none of the
participants received such an extra page.) Participants
were next told that their group would have to do several
tasks. The Wrst task would be to decide whom to hire as a
new employee in their organization. It was made clear
that in a later phase of the experiment they would
receive several application forms on which to base the
hiring decision.
Before starting the tasks, participants were required
to answer a few questions about their perception of hir-
ing procedures in organizations, and the experimenter
then collected these answers. Thereafter, participants
received an extra booklet, which contained information
about the decision-making procedure. In the voice condi-
tion, participants were individually informed that the
board leader had decided to ask his or her opinion
regarding the hiring decision. Participants in the no-voice
condition were individually informed that the leader had
decided not to ask his or her opinion with respect to the
hiring decision. To assess whether the procedure manip-
ulation evoked diVerences in perceived procedural
fairness, participants were asked to indicate on a seven-
point scale how fair they considered the decision proce-
dure of the board leader to be (1 D very unfair, 7 D very
fair).
Participants were then informed that their group
entered a new Wscal quarter and therefore all board
members would receive some organizational resources
from a common pool. The resource that each board
member received was 300 points (each point was worth
100 Dutch Guilders or approximately 50 US dollars).
Participants were told that an investment plan would be
introduced that would enable the organization to gain
additional resources. According to this investment plan,
each board member could invest or contribute some or
all of the resources received into an investment plan. It
was, however, important to realize that in a latter phase
of the study, the leader would be able to monitor and
regulate the distribution of the resources.
Participants were told that if the total sum of invest-
ments equaled or exceeded 900 points (the provision
point was adjusted downward to 750 points if it were a
Wve-person group), the total sum would be doubled and
the leader would distribute that sum among all board
members. Thus, the leader was responsible for the distri-
bution of the outcomes and all board members would
receive some part of the investment bonus, regardless of
their contribution. As such, the leader would distributethe total amount contributed, but participants did not
know exactly how the leader would distribute the
amount amongst the diVerent group members. However,
if the total sum invested was less than 900 points (or 750
points, in a Wve person group), then all investments
would be lost. Thus, each board member could lose his
or her investment if the group as a whole did not con-
tribute enough. As such, it was made clear that all group
members were interdependent on one another. All par-
ticipants were then asked how much they were willing to
invest (ranging from 0 to 300 points). When the partici-
pants had answered this question, the study was Wnished
and they were thoroughly debriefed and thanked.
Results and discussion
Correlational analyses showed that both ISC and
voice were positively related to investment behavior
(both p values < .001), and that voice was unrelated to
ISC.
Manipulation check
A one-way ANOVA on participants’ perceptions of
procedural fairness yielded a signiWcant eVect,
F(1,74)D 117.60, p < .001, 2 D .61. Inspection of the
means indicated that, as expected, participants in the voice
condition judged the procedure to be fairer (MD5.58,
SD D0.91; 95% conWdence interval: 5.26–5.89) than par-
ticipants in the no-voice condition (MD 3.13, SDD1.04;
95% conWdence interval: 2.81–3.45).
Contribution behavior
We performed a hierarchical regression analysis on
participants’ investments to test for the predicted inter-
action eVect between voice and the centered ISC vari-
able. The main eVects of voice and ISC were entered
simultaneously on the Wrst step, and the interaction of
the two was added on the second step. Of greatest
importance, and as can be seen in Table 1, the predicted
interaction eVect was signiWcant (p < .05). To illustrate
the nature of the interaction (cf. Aiken & West, 1991), we
computed the relationship between voice and contribu-
tion behavior at a high level of ISC (one SD above the
Table 1
Results of hierarchical regression analysis of contribution behavior as
a function of ISC and voice (Study 1)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of estimate.
* p < .05.
** p < .001.
Terms Model 1 Model 2
ISC .36 (.10)** .42 (.32)
Voice .33 (.10)** .33 (.09)**
ISC £ Voice .82 (.32)*
R2 .26 .32
Overall F 13.37** 11.75**
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mean). As can be seen in Fig. 1, the interaction took its
predicted form. Voice was more positively related to
investment behavior among those high rather than low
in ISC. Simple slope analyses further revealed that
among those high in ISC, voice was signiWcantly related
to contribution behavior,  D .59, p < .005, whereas
among those low in ISC, the presence or absence of voice
was not signiWcantly related to contribution behavior,
 D ¡.08, p D .53.
Study 2
Study 2 was designed to test for the generality of the
interactive relationship between ISC and voice, by exam-
ining it in the context of a diVerent type of interpersonal
encounter (reward allocation), and by employing a
diVerent type of dependent variable (positive aVect).
Most justice studies of emotional reactions have exam-
ined negative aVect, probably because injustice is
believed to elicit feelings of anger and resentment (Fol-
ger & Cropanzano, 1998; Mikula, Scherer, & Athens-
taedt, 1998). Mikula et al. (1998) suggest, however, that a
wider range of emotions diVering in valence also may be
inXuenced by procedural fairness. Therefore, given the
relative paucity of studies on how procedural fairness
may inXuence people’s positive emotional reactions (for
a recent exception, see Van den Bos & Spruijt, 2002), and
given the pervasive inXuence of positive aVect on
employees’ attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Isen & Baron,
1991), positive aVect served as the dependent variable in
Study 1. We expected to Wnd a signiWcant interaction
between voice and ISC, such that the tendency for par-
ticipants to respond with more positive aVect when voice
Fig. 1. The relationship between procedural fairness and contribution
behavior as a function of ISC (Study 1).is high rather than low will be more pronounced among
those high rather than low in ISC.
Method
Participants
Eighty-four students (16 men and 68 women) at the
Free University in Amsterdam participated in the exper-
iment and were paid for their participation.
Experimental procedure
Participants were invited to the laboratory to take
part in a study on how people perform tasks. On arrival
at the laboratory, participants were led to separate cubi-
cles, each of which contained a computer with a monitor
and a keyboard. Next to the monitor, participants found
pieces of paper and a pencil. Participants were told that
the computers were connected to one another and that
the experimenter could communicate with them by
means of the computer network. The computers were
used to present the stimulus information and to collect
data on the dependent variables and the manipulation
checks. Participants took part in the experiment and
answered the questions that constituted the dependent
variables and the manipulation checks after participat-
ing in another, unrelated study. The studies lasted a total
of approximately 105 min, and participants were paid 20
Dutch guilders for their participation (1 Dutch guilder
equaled approximately $0.50 US at the time of the
study).
After they had participated in the other study partici-
pants were informed that they would now take part in
two additional studies that also were unrelated to each
other. In the “Wrst study” participants were asked to
complete the Singelis (1994) measure of ISC used in
Study 1. Responses ranged from strongly disagree (1) to
strongly agree (7). Participants’ responses to the measure
of ISC were averaged into an index. CoeYcient  was .69.
Participants in the voice relative to the no voice condi-
tions did not diVer signiWcantly in their level of ISC,
t (82) D .25, ns, a Wnding that was expected in light of the
fact that participants had been randomly assigned to the
voice and no voice conditions.
After this, the “second study” was started. In the Wrst
part of the instructions, participants were informed that
they would be taking part in the study with another per-
son, referred to as Other. The experimental procedure
was then outlined to the participants. After the experi-
mental tasks were explained, participants were to prac-
tice the tasks for 2 min, after which time they were to
work on the tasks for 10 min. Furthermore, participants
were informed that after the study was completed a lot-
tery would be held including all participants. The winner
of this lottery would receive 100 Dutch guilders. (In fact,
after all participants had completed the experiment, the
100 Dutch guilders were given to one participant, chosen
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tery tickets would be divided among all participants.
Furthermore, participants were told that after the work
round the experimenter would divide some lottery tick-
ets between them and Other. Seven practice questions
were posed to ensure comprehension of the lottery. If
participants gave a wrong answer to a question, the cor-
rect answer was disclosed and the main characteristics of
the lottery were repeated.
The task was then explained to the participants. Fig-
ures were to be presented on the upper right part of the
computer screen. Each Wgure consisted of 36 squares,
and each square showed one of eight distinct patterns.
On the upper left side of the computer screen one of the
eight patterns would be presented, and participants had
to count the number of squares with this pattern in the
Wgure on the right side of the screen. When participants
had indicated the correct number of patterns in the
Wgure on the right side of the screen, another Wgure and
another pattern would be presented on the screen. In
both the practice round and the work round, the number
of tasks that the participant had completed (i.e., the
number of Wgures that the participant had counted) in
the current round was presented on the lower right side
of the screen. On the lower left side of the screen the time
remaining in the present round was shown.
The practice round then began, after which the work
round began. After the work round had ended, partici-
pants were told how many tasks they had completed in
the work round, and—in order to make it more likely
that participants compared themselves to Other—it was
communicated to the participant that Other had com-
pleted an equivalent number of tasks. To assess whether
participants thought of Other as a person who was com-
parable in the amount of inputs he or she provided, they
were asked to what extent Other had performed well in
the work round relative to the performance of the partic-
ipant (1 D much worse, 4 D equally, 7 D much better),
and to what extent Other was good in performing the
tasks in the work round relative to the participant self
(1 D much worse, 4 D equally, 7 D much better). Partici-
pants were then asked to think for one minute about the
percentage of lottery tickets that they should receive rel-
ative to Other.
After this, procedural fairness was manipulated. In
the voice condition, the experimenter asked participants,
by means of the computer network, to type in their opin-
ion about the percentage of tickets that they should
receive relative to Other. Participants in the no voice con-
dition (which was explicit, see Van den Bos, 1999) were
informed that they would not be asked to type their
opinion about the percentage of tickets that they should
receive relative to Other.
Participants were subsequently asked questions per-
taining to the dependent variable and manipulation
checks. All ratings were made on 7-point scales. PositiveaVect was assessed by asking participants to what extent
they were in a positive mood (1 D very weak, 7 D very
strong), to what extent they felt proud (1 D very weak,
7 D very strong), and to what extent they felt good about
themselves (1 D very weak, 7 D very strong). These
dependent variables were strongly correlated and were
averaged to form a scale of positive aVect (Cronbach’s
D .88). To assess whether the manipulation of proce-
dure evoked diVerences in perceived fairness, partici-
pants were asked how fair (1 D very unfair, 7 D very fair),
just (1 D very injust, 7 D very just), and justiWed (1 D very
unjustiWed, 7 D very justiWed) they considered the way in
which they had been treated. These three items were
strongly correlated and were averaged to form a proce-
dural fairness scale (Cronbach’s D .95).
To check whether the voice manipulation had been
perceived as intended, participants were asked to what
extent they agreed with the statement that they had been
given an opportunity to voice their opinion about the
number of tickets they should receive relative to other,
and to what extent they agreed with the statement that
they had not been given an opportunity to voice their
opinion about the number of tickets they should receive
relative to other (1D strongly disagree, 7D strongly agree).
Results
Correlational analyses showed that the bivariate rela-
tionships between voice, ISC, and positive aVect were
not signiWcant.
Manipulation checks
A one-way multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) on the two manipulation checks of voice
(the voice check and the no-voice check) yielded highly
signiWcant eVects at both the multivariate and the uni-
variate levels: multivariate F (2,82) D 129.63, p < .001,
2 D .76; for the voice check, F (1, 82) D 240.38, p < .001,
2 D .75; for the no-voice check, F (1, 82) D 173.40,
p < .001, 2 D .68. Participants in the voice condition
agreed more with the statement that they had received
an opportunity to voice their opinion (M D 5.83,
SD D 1.38, 95% conWdence interval: 5.40–6.26) than par-
ticipants in the no-voice condition (M D 1.57, SD D 1.13,
95% conWdence interval: 1.22–1.92). Participants in the
no-voice condition agreed more with the statement that
they had not received an opportunity to voice their opin-
ion (M D 6.24, SD D 1.43, 95% conWdence interval: 5.79–
6.68) than participants in the voice condition (M D 2.07,
SD D 1.47, 95% conWdence interval: 1.61–2.53). It can be
concluded that the voice manipulation was successfully
operationalized.
Perceived procedural fairness
A one-way ANOVA on the procedural fairness scale
yielded a signiWcant eVect, F (1, 82) D 126.58, p < .001,
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expected, participants in the voice condition judged the
procedure to be fairer (M D 5.56, SD D 0.74, 95% conW-
dence interval: 5.33–5.78) than participants in the no-
voice condition (M D 2.94, SD D 1.32, 95% conWdence
interval: 2.53–3.35).
Comparability measures
As expected, participants’ comparability judgments
yielded no signiWcant eVects at both the multivariate
level and the univariate levels. Participants indicated
that the other participant had performed equally well in
the work round (M D 3.98, SD D 0.35, 95% conWdence
interval: 3.90–4.05), and was equally good in performing
the tasks (M D 3.96, SD D 0.45, 95% conWdence interval:
3.87–4.06). Thus, participants thought of the other per-
son as a comparable person with respect to the tasks that
were completed in the experiment.
Percentage Wndings
Participants who were allowed voice (n D 42) typed in
their opinion about the percentage of tickets that they
should receive relative to the other participant. Virtually
all of them (40 out of 42) indicated that the lottery tick-
ets should be divided equally between themselves and
the other participant, a Wnding that was expected in light
of the fact that participants believed that they had per-
formed at the same level as the Other.
Dependent variable
We performed a hierarchical regression on the mea-
sure of positive aVect, in which the main eVects of voice
(coded as a dummy variable) and the centered (Aiken &
West, 1991) ISC variable were entered on the Wrst step,
followed by the interaction between the two on the sec-
ond step. Table 2 shows the results of this analysis. Most
relevant for the current purposes is that the interaction
eVect was signiWcant (p < .001). To illustrate the nature of
the interaction, based on the procedures recommended
by Aiken and West (1991) we computed the relationship
between voice and positive aVect at a high level of ISC
(one SD above the mean) and at a low level of ISC (one
SD below the mean). As predicted, and as can be seen in
Fig. 2, the positive relationship between voice and posi-
tive aVect was more pronounced among those high rather
Table 2
Results of hierarchical regression analysis of positive aVect ratings as a
function of ISC and voice (study 2)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of estimate.
* p < .001.
Terms Model 1 Model 2
ISC .01 (.18) .00 (.17)
Voice ¡.36 (.24) .36 (.22)
ISC £ Voice ¡1.29 (.34)*
R2 .03 .18
Overall F 1.10 5.76*than low in ISC. Simple slope analyses provide further
insight into the nature of the interaction eVect (Aiken &
West, 1991). Among those high in ISC, positive aVect was
signiWcantly greater in the voice than in the no voice con-
dition, D .61, p < .04, whereas among those low in ISC
the presence or absence of voice was not signiWcantly
related to positive aVect, D¡.35, p D .20.
Subsidiary analyses
The psychometric properties of the ISC measure have
been a matter of some controversy (e.g., Grace & Cramer,
2003; Levine et al., 2003). Taken together, the results of
Studies 1 and 2 provided some evidence that the Singelis
(1994) measure was both reliable and valid. In both stud-
ies coeYcient s attained respectable levels, and ISC mod-
erated the eVects of voice in the theoretically expected
direction. To further evaluate the uni-dimensionality of
the ISC measure we conducted a conWrmatory factor
analysis (CFA), in which we evaluated the Wt of a single-
factor model. In fact, the CFA did not provide evidence of
a good Wt, 2 (54)D81.63, p< .01; root means square error
of approximationD .08; root mean square residualD .17;
comparative Wt indexD .74. Post hoc inspection showed
that the Wrst three items appearing in Singelis’ (1994)
description of the measure did not load well. Upon
removing these three items from the CFA, we found that
the single-factor solution provided a much better Wt, 2
(27)D34.91, (p> .10); root means square error of
approximationD.06; root mean square residualD .17;
comparative Wt indexD .90. Furthermore, when we-ran the
multiple regression analysis in which the Wrst three items
from the ISC had been deleted, the interaction eVect
between ISC and voice became even larger, with its F ratio
growing from 14.75–19.00. Given the unexpected eVects
associated with deleting the Wrst three items from the ISC
measure, we re-evaluated them in upcoming Study 3.
Fig. 2. The relationship between procedural fairness and positive aVect
as a function of ISC (Study 2).
162 J. Brockner et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 96 (2005) 155–167Participants in Study 1 also completed the Rosenberg
(1965) self-esteem measure, which was included in the
same survey that contained the ISC. Self-esteem was sig-
niWcantly related to ISC, rD¡.36, p <.01, albeit moder-
ately so. We also conducted a regression analysis to
determine whether self-esteem moderated the relationship
between voice and positive aVect. Importantly, the interac-
tion between self-esteem and voice did not even approach
signiWcance (p>.20), thereby providing some evidence of
the discriminant validity of the measure of ISC.
Discussion
As predicted, the results of Study 2 showed that those
participants high in ISC reacted more positively when
voice was allowed than when voice was denied. No such
diVerence was found for those low in ISC. Although the
Weld of organizational justice has reported eVects of fair-
ness perceptions on people’s aVective reactions (e.g.,
Weiss, Suckow, & Cropanzano, 1999), aVective reactions
are used relatively infrequently as dependent variables in
the justice literature (Tyler & Smith, 1998). The present
Wndings show that it is important to assess positive aVect
not only because of its pervasive eVects on people’s work
attitudes and behaviors (e.g., Isen & Baron, 1991), but
also because ISC moderated the eVect of voice on peo-
ple’s level of positive aVect.
The enhancing eVect of voice on people’s attitudes
and behaviors is one of the most robust Wndings in the
procedural justice literature (e.g., Lind & Tyler, 1988;
Thibaut & Walker, 1975). Given the generally positive
eVects of voice that have been found in past research, it
is noteworthy that giving voice to those low in ISC did
not have any inXuence on their aVective states in Study 2
(and on their contribution behavior in Study 1).
Furthermore, the Wndings provide insight into the
important question of not whether, but rather when pro-
cedural fairness eVects may be accounted for by certain
social psychological explanations. That is, social psycho-
logical explanations of the positive eVect of giving peo-
ple voice seem to be particularly applicable to those
relatively high in ISC and not to those low in ISC.
Study 3
Study 3 was designed to evaluate further the interac-
tive relationship between voice and ISC. In particular, the
generality of the results of Studies 1 and 2 was evaluated
in four ways. First, Study 3 was based on a diVerent con-
ception (and operationalization) of procedural fairness.
In Studies 1 and 2, procedural fairness consisted of voice.
Whereas voice is one element or determinant of proce-
dural fairness, it is by no means the only one (Leventhal,
1980). For example, people’s perceptions of procedural
fairness also depend upon the quality of the interpersonaltreatment that they experience in their interactions with
others. Indeed, the very core of certain social psychologi-
cal explanations of fair process eVects suggests that peo-
ple’s attitudes and behaviors should be inXuenced by the
fairness of their interpersonal treatment (Bies, 1987),
which both informs people about the quality of their
relationships with the other party, and reXects the extent
to which moral values have been aYrmed in the course of
their social encounters. Moreover, the social psychologi-
cal explanations suggest that the eVects of fairness of
interpersonal treatment should be especially pronounced
among those higher in ISC, who attach greater psycho-
logical signiWcance to (i.e., deWne themselves based on)
their relationships with others, and in so doing, may
more strongly prefer that moral values are aYrmed in
their social encounters. Accordingly, the fairness of the
interpersonal treatment that participants experienced
served as the conceptualization of procedural fairness in
Study 3. We expected its inXuence on the dependent vari-
able (described below) to be more pronounced among
those high rather than low in ISC.
Second, the focal interaction between procedural fair-
ness and ISC was examined in a diVerent social context,
relative to Studies 1 and 2. More speciWcally, partici-
pants in Study 3 took part in a negotiation exercise.
Third, the dependent variable in Study 3 diVered, rela-
tive to that assessed in the earlier studies. SpeciWcally,
participants rated their desire for future interaction with
their negotiation partner, which may be considered to be
a proxy for their judgments of the quality of their
encounter with the other. Finally, Study 3 was con-
ducted in a diVerent cultural context (Japan), thereby
enabling us to evaluate whether the expected interaction
between procedural fairness and ISC may be found in an
Asian (rather than European) context.
In summary, all participants in Study 3 took part in a
negotiation with one other person. Independent vari-
ables consisted of ISC as well as the perceived fairness of
the interpersonal treatment that participants received
from their negotiation partner, and the dependent vari-
able was participants’ desire for future interaction with
their negotiation partner. We predicted that the positive
relationship between fairness of interpersonal treatment
and desire for future interaction with the other party
would be signiWcantly stronger among those high rather
than low in ISC. Indeed, strong evidence for our hypoth-
esis would be revealed if, in spite of the many diVerences
between Study 3 and its predecessors we were to Wnd an
interaction eVect conceptually analogous to those found
in the earlier studies.
Method
Participants
Participants were 118 senior undergraduate business
majors at Shiga University in Japan. They participated
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management course.
Experimental procedure
Upon arrival at the negotiating session, all partici-
pants were asked to Wll out a pre-negotiation question-
naire that included the measure of ISC. After they
completed this questionnaire, participants were ran-
domly assigned to play the role of either the executive
vice-president of an outdoor sports manufacturer (seller)
or the executive vice-president of a company that pro-
vides protective Wre-Wghting clothing to Wre departments
(buyer) in a dyadic, mixed-motive negotiation. They
were given 30 min to read their role materials and a max-
imum of 40 min to complete the negotiation.
Upon Wnishing the negotiation, all participants were
given a post-negotiation questionnaire which measured
their perceptions of the fairness of their partner’s inter-
personal treatment towards them, their desire for future
interaction with the negotiation partner, and a control
variable to be described below.
Task overview
The experimental negotiation task, called Z-Tec, was
adapted from a negotiation simulation described by
Bazerman and Neale (1992, p. 85). To assess the clarity
and appropriateness of the simulation, we pre-tested it
with 10 Japanese business school students at Shiga Uni-
versity, all of whom indicated that the description was
clear and the negotiation context was not unusual.
All materials were administered in Japanese. In devel-
oping the Japanese versions of the materials, we
employed the back-translation procedure (Brislin, 1980).
That is, the materials were Wrst translated from English
to Japanese by a Japanese graduate student who was
also Xuent in English. The versions then were translated
back to English by a graduate student from the United
States who was also Xuent in Japanese. The new English
version was then compared with the original; any dis-




The 12-item Singelis (1994) measure used in the previ-
ous two studies was also employed in this study. All
responses were recorded on a seven-point rating scale
with endpoints labeled “strongly disagree” (1) and
“strongly agree” (7). CoeYcient  was .73.
Fairness of interpersonal treatment
The extent to which participants felt that they were
treated fairly by the other party was assessed with a
three-item measure: (1) “In your opinion, how fairly did
the other party treat you?”, (2) “How much respect anddignity did the other party show to you during the nego-
tiation?”, and (3) “How often did the other party show
attempts to understand your concerns and interests dur-
ing the negotiation?”. Responses on the seven-point rat-
ing scale could range from “not at all” (1) to “very
much” (7). CoeYcient  was .87.
Desire for future interaction
The desire to engage in future interaction with their
negotiating partner was assessed with participants’
responses to the following item: “How much do you
want to continue any future business dealings with the
same party?” Endpoints on the seven-point rating scale
were “not at all” (1) and “very much” (7).
Control variables
Social exchange theory (e.g., Blau, 1964) and empiri-
cal research (e.g., Brockner, Chen, Mannix, Leung, &
Skarlicki, 2000) has shown that people’s desire for ongo-
ing interaction with one another depends upon the
favorability of their prior encounters. Accordingly, we
included a four-item measure of participants’ perceived
favorability of their negotiation outcome, e.g., “How sat-
isWed are you with your individual proWt level?”
Responses, which could range from “not at all” (1) to
“very much” (7), were averaged into an index. CoeY-
cient  was. 73. We also controlled for the role that par-
ticipants played during the negotiation (buyer or seller).
Results
Summary statistics and intercorrelations are shown in
Table 3. Perhaps most noteworthy is that ISC was
uncorrelated with the measures of procedural fairness,
outcome favorability, and desire for future interaction,
even though all of the measures were assessed with a
common method (self-report).
The hypothesis was tested with the use of a hierarchi-
cal regression analysis. In the Wrst step we entered the
control variables of outcome favorability and role, and
the main eVects of the centered variables of fairness of
interpersonal treatment and ISC. On the second step we
added the interaction between treatment fairness and
ISC. Of greatest importance, and as can be seen in
Table 4, the interaction eVect was signiWcant (p < .05).
Table 3
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations of Study 3 variables
* p < .001.
Variables M SD 1 2 3 4 5
1 Desire for future 
interaction
5.07 1.39 —
2 Outcome favorability 4.25 1.13 .32* —
3 Procedural fairness 4.69 0.85 .30* .30* —
4 ISC 4.39 0.67 .06 .08 .07 —
5 Role 0.50 0.50 .04 ¡.07 ¡.01 .09 —
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puted the relationship between fairness of interpersonal
treatment and desire for future interaction at a high level
of ISC (one SD above the mean) and at a low level of ISC
(one SD below the mean; Aiken & West, 1991). Fig. 3
shows that the interaction eVect took its predicted form,
in which treatment fairness and desire for future interac-
tion were more positively related to one another when
ISC was high rather than low. Furthermore, simple slope
analyses showed that the positive relationship between
fairness of treatment and desire for future interaction was
signiWcant when ISC was high (D 1.57, p < .05), and that
treatment fairness and desire for future interaction were
unrelated when ISC was low (D 0.70, ns).3
Subsidiary analyses
As in Study 2, we conducted a conWrmatory factor
analysis on the measure of ISC, evaluating the Wt of a
single-factor solution. As in Study 2, the single-factor
solution did not provide evidence of a good Wt: 2
(55) D 87.32, p < .01; root means square error of
approximation D .07; root mean square residual D .25;
comparative Wt index D .51. Prompted by the CFA
results in Study 2, we evaluated whether deleting the Wrst
three items from the Singelis (1994) measure had the
eVect of improving the Wt of a single-factor solution. In
fact, it did; 2 (27) D 29.54, p > .30; root means square
error of approximation D .03; root mean square
residual D .15; comparative Wt index D .93. Moreover, as
in Study 2, when we re-ran the regression analysis delet-
3 In light of research showing an interaction eVect between proce-
dural fairness and outcome favorability (Brockner & Wiesenfeld,
1996), we conducted an additional step to the hierarchical regression,
in which the interaction between fairness of interpersonal treatment
and outcome favorability was added to the interaction term already
entered in Table 4, Step 2. In fact, the interaction between fairness of
interpersonal treatment and outcome favorability was not signiWcant.
Of perhaps greater importance, however, adding the interaction be-
tween fairness of interpersonal treatment and outcome favorability
had no eVect on the signiWcance level of the interaction between fair-
ness of interpersonal treatment and ISC, which remained signiWcant at
the .05 level.
Table 4
Results of hierarchical regression analysis of desire for future interac-
tion as a function of ISC and fairness of treatment (Study 3)
Note. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors of estimate.
* p < .05.
** p < .01.
*** p < .001.
Terms Model 1 Model 2
Role ¡.18 (.24) ¡.16 (.24)
Outcome favorability .28 (.11)* .31 (.11)**
ISC .25 (.20) ¡2.81 (1.16)*
Fairness of treatment .31 (.15)* ¡1.69 (.79)*
ISC £ Fairness of treatment .55 (.24)*
R2 .15 .20
Overall F 5.14*** 5.61***ing the Wrst three items from the ISC measure, the inter-
action eVect between ISC and Fairness of Treatment
grew in magnitude (from an F of 5.15 to an F of 5.95).
Discussion
One of the shortcomings of Study 3 is that the depen-
dent variable consisted of a single item measure. In
response to this concern, we raise the following two
points. First, the results of Study 3 are buttressed by the
results of Studies 1 and 2, in which highly similar results
emerged. In Study 1, the dependent variable was a
behavioral measure of cooperation and in Study 2 the
dependent variable was a multiple-item measure of posi-
tive aVect with high internal consistency. The fact that
similar results emerged across all three studies strongly
suggests that the results of Study 3 are not an artifact of
the dependent variable consisting of a single item mea-
sure. Second, the same item used in Study 3 is actually
one of three items used to measure desire for future
interaction with the other party in other research (Chen
& Chen, 2004). The other two items in that study were:
(a) “How much are you willing to introduce this negoti-
ating person to your future company as a client?”, and
(b) “How much are you willing to negotiate (or partner)
with the same negotiating person in future in-class nego-
tiation simulations?” Importantly, all three items were
highly interrelated, as indicated by the coeYcient  of
.93. Thus, the single item measure used in Study 3 is
highly related to other face valid measures of desire for
future interaction with the other party in a negotiation
setting. Nevertheless, future research would be better
served by the use of multi-item scales, or, more generally,
other sorts of measures with proven construct validity.
Fig. 3. The relationship between fairness of treatment and desire for
future interaction as a function of ISC (Study 3).
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Taken together, the Wndings show that perceptions of
procedural fairness have very diVerent eVects on people
high versus low in ISC. In all three studies, participants
reacted strongly to procedural fairness information
when they were high in ISC, but not when they were low
in ISC. Brockner, Ackerman, and Fairchild (2001) sug-
gested that one way to achieve conceptual progress in
the organizational justice literature is by identifying the
conditions under which procedural fairness factors are
more versus less impactful. Accordingly, the present
research joins a growing list of studies that have delin-
eated pervasive moderators of the eVects of procedural
justice such as outcome favorability (e.g., Brockner &
Wiesenfeld, 1996) and uncertainty (e.g., Van den Bos &
Lind, 2002).
Further, the present Wndings also demonstrate the
robustness of the moderating inXuence of ISC. First, we
found the eVect in three diVerent types of interpersonal
encounters, that is, social dilemmas, reward allocations,
and negotiations. Second, the present studies used diVer-
ent elements of procedural fairness (voice and fairness of
interpersonal treatment), and showed that ISC had a
similar moderating inXuence on both elements. Indeed,
Leventhal (1980) argued that multiple factors may inXu-
ence procedural fairness and that research needs to focus
on all of them to reveal a better understanding of the
psychology of procedural justice. In a similar vein,
Brockner et al. (2001) suggested that it is important to
evaluate whether moderators of procedural fairness
eVects are limited to a single determinant of procedural
fairness, or whether they apply to multiple determinants
of procedural fairness. The present Wndings suggest that
ISC as a moderator certainly is not limited to a single
aspect of procedural fairness.
Third, the moderating eVect of ISC on procedural
fairness was also found on diVerent dependent measures.
Our studies demonstrated that variations in fairness of
procedures inXuenced people’s contribution behavior,
positive aVect, and desire for future interaction, particu-
larly if they were high in ISC. The fact that converging
results emerged on an assortment of dependent variables
suggests that the Wndings have implications for a num-
ber of domains of organizational behavior. Finally, this
interaction eVect was demonstrated in two diVerent cul-
tures, the Netherlands (Europe) and Japan (Asia). In
short, the similarities in Wndings that emerged in the face
of all these noteworthy diVerences bodes well for the
construct validity of: (1) the independent variables of
procedural fairness and ISC, and (2) the inXuence of ISC
on procedural fairness eVects.
Importantly, the Wndings of all three studies speak to
the question of when certain social psychological expla-
nations may best account for procedural fairness eVects.
That is, the present research was designed not to exam-ine whether social psychological explanations of fair
process eVects are more appropriate than others (e.g.,
instrumental perspectives) that have gained traction in
the organizational justice literature. Rather, the present
research was designed to begin the important task of
delineating the conditions under which or the people for
whom social psychological explanations are appropriate.
Indeed, the choice of ISC as a moderator variable was
motivated by prior theory and research suggesting that
people are aVected by procedural fairness because it
communicates information about how they are viewed
by the other party, and because it says something about
how much basic moral values are being aYrmed in the
course of the encounter. Hence, people who assign
greater importance to these social psychological consid-
erations (namely, those high in ISC) were expected to be
more aVected by the level of procedural fairness that
they perceived.
The present studies also contribute to the organiza-
tional justice literature on the basis of the dependent
variables that were assessed. Recently, a strong plea has
been made to examine how perceptions of fairness inXu-
ence aVective reactions (Tyler & Smith, 1998; Van den
Bos & Miedema, 2000; Weiss et al., 1999). Although jus-
tice is quite often thought of as an aVective event, most
social and organizational justice research has, indeed,
neglected this response variable. This tendency is rather
disappointing because emotions are a fundamental
aspect of life in work organizations (Isen & Baron,
1991), and therefore warrant careful study (e.g., Brief,
2001). The results of Study 2 showed that voice inXu-
enced participants’ aVective reactions, particularly
among those high in ISC. Also, research on interper-
sonal relationships has shown that positive emotions are
experienced more when belongingness needs are met (e.g.
Baumeister & Leary, 1995), an assumption that is in line
with the present Wnding that among those relatively high
in ISC the presence or absence of voice had more of an
eVect on their levels of positive aVect.
Furthermore, the voice manipulation in Study 1 also
inXuenced cooperative behavior in a social dilemma situ-
ation. Much of the research on procedural fairness in
organizational settings has not assessed its impact on the
important behavioral outcome of cooperation (see
Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995; for the importance of
cooperation in organizational settings). The present Wnd-
ings show that in organizational public goods dilemmas,
perceived voice inXuenced contribution decisions, partic-
ularly among those high in ISC (cf. De Cremer & Van
Vugt, 2002).
Before closing we should mention some limitations of
the present research, and thereby suggest some possible
leads for future research. One of the shortcomings per-
tains to the conceptualization and assessment of ISC.
Recently, several criticisms of the construct have been
raised, stressing the fact that a sole focus on the social
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Fiske, 2002). Furthermore, there is considerable debate
concerning the assessment of ISC (Grace & Cramer,
2003; Levine et al., 2003). The fact that CFAs yielded
similar results in Studies 2 and 3, and the fact that the
primary results became even stronger when the Wrst
three items from the Singelis (1994) measure had been
deleted, suggests that further research is needed to clarify
both the conceptualization and operationalization of
ISC. For example, future research should clarify the dis-
tinctions between ISC and the broader family of collec-
tivism-related beliefs documented by Oyserman et al.
(2002).
Second, whereas the moderating eVect of ISC on pro-
cedural fairness was highly consistent across a very
diverse set of studies, some between-study inconsisten-
cies in the Wndings warrant further attention. For exam-
ple, ISC yielded a signiWcant main eVect in Study 1 only.
Why might that have been the case? Because ISC reXects
the importance people assign to their relationships, those
high in ISC might strategically choose to behave in ways
that foster more positive, enjoyable, and cooperative
relationships. Note, that the dependent variables in the
three studies may have diVered in the extent to which
they gave participants the opportunity to foster more
positive, enjoyable, and cooperative relationships. The
dependent variable in Study 2 consisted of an aVective
measure, whereas the dependent variable in Study 3 con-
sisted of an attitudinal measure (desire for future inter-
action). In contrast, the dependent variable in Study 1
was a behavioral measure of cooperation. Perhaps par-
ticipants in Study 1 felt that they might have been able to
inXuence the emerging relationship with their fellow par-
ticipants (to be more cooperative) if they were to behave
cooperatively themselves. If so, then the tendency to
behave cooperatively should be more likely to be exhib-
ited by those high in ISC. Further research is needed to
evaluate this speculation.
A third potential limitation is that the research set-
tings may have aVorded relatively low levels of contex-
tual realism or meaning for the participants. For
example, in Study 1, participants did not have expecta-
tions for future interactions, were a member of a Wcti-
tious company, and did not know the group leader. In
addition, participants received a written note with
respect to the voice procedure. Thus, the testing condi-
tions in the present studies were not representative of the
kinds of interactions that take place in contemporary
organizations. Future Weld research is needed to examine
the present predictions under more realistic (and engag-
ing) conditions.
Fourth, the present studies merely looked at the mod-
erating impact of interdependent self-construal but not
at the moderating eVect of independent self-construal
(Markus & Kitayama, 1991). Being high in independent
self-construal refers to seeing “oneself as an individualwhose behavior is organized and made meaningful pri-
marily by reference to one’s own internal repertoire of
thoughts, feelings, and actions, rather than by reference
to the thoughts, feelings, and actions of others” (Markus
& Kitayama, 1991, p. 226). Singelis (1994) has shown
that interdependent and independent self-construals rep-
resent two distinct dimensions, rather than being end-
points on a single dimension. Whereas the present study
shows that interdependent self-construal has a moderat-
ing inXuence on procedural fairness, future research
needs to evaluate whether the same may be said for inde-
pendent self-construal.
Fifth, we focused on two distinct social psychological
explanations of procedural fairness eVects, one empha-
sizing the implications of relational considerations for
people’s sense of self, and the other focused on people’s
desire to see basic moral values aYrmed in social
encounters. Whereas these two factors may be related to
one another, they are conceptually distinct. Thus, future
research is needed to delineate when one of these social
psychological explanations is more or less likely to
account for the eVects of procedural fairness on employ-
ees’ cognitions, emotions, and behavior.
In conclusion, the present studies make an important
contribution to the organizational justice literature by
showing a highly consistent inXuence of a theoretically
derived individual diVerence variable, interdependent
self-construal, on procedural fairness eVects. In so doing,
we also help to identify not whether, but rather when
certain social psychological explanations may be partic-
ularly well-suited to account for the pervasive eVects of
procedural fairness information.
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